ABSTRACT The cooperative spectrum sensing of cognitive radio networks is quite important in the flexibility of spectrum sharing. The fusion center makes the access decision based on the feedback local sensing information from the secondary users (SUs). However, the local sensing information, which includes the SUs' geographical data, poses a threat to the privacy of those users. Security should be preserved in order to protect the SUs' privacy. In this paper, we aim to preserve the SUs' privacy and propose a locationbased privacy protection strategy based on the users' mobile trajectory. The proposed privacy protection algorithm is based on the coordinates mean value, which considers the correlation of various attributes of current privacy protection methods, e.g., the k-anonymity algorithm and the generalization algorithm. The algorithm is optimized by the stochastic gradient descent method to obtain the best performance given different k-values. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm is effective in terms of the degree of privacy protection, average anonymous time, cost, and loss.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) have been regarded as an effective technology for solving the spectrum inadequacy issue [1] - [3] . It permits secondary users (SUs) to take advantage of spectrum holes, which are not occupied by the primary users (PUs), in order to improve wireless transmission efficiency. The service provider (SP) in CRNs is composed of several SUs which operate cooperatively in spectrum sensing. Multiple SPs can work together to determine the available spectrum bands [4] , [5] . Due to the open characteristics of the CRNs, the data exchanged between the SUs and PUs or within the SPs is vulnerable to attacks [6] - [8] . It is a worth noting the problem that the geographical locations of the SUs can be disclosed for malicious purposes, e.g., the locations may be utilized for commercial advertisement recommendations. Protection of the privacy of SUs in this regard is essential in CRNs, especially due to participation incentives for the SUs [9] - [11] .
Generally, there are two types of locations of SUs: the single-point location and the trajectory [12] , [13] . The term ''single-point location'' means the static geographical location of the SUs at a specific time, while the ''trajectory'' is the continuous location set which is generated by the SUs' location query requests. Current privacy protection algorithms, which are mainly used for single-point location, cannot be directly applied to the privacy protection of the trajectory [14] , [15] . For instance, the attacks can obtain the behavior and the specific location of the SUs by analyzing the context of the SUs' trajectory.
Among the privacy protection algorithms, the k-anonymity technique, proposed by Sweeney [16] , is one of the most widely used methods. Its main idea is that within the datasets, one record should not be distinguished from at least (k − 1) other records. The overall k records should be the same in terms of the private items, e.g., location, age, income. Thus, this condition is referred to as ''k-anonymity.'' Currently, there are three types of location protection algorithms: the falsifying, restraining, and generalization methods.
The falsifying method involves replacing the real location data with false data in order to keep the real location confidential [17] - [19] . It is hoped that the falsified data will confuse the attackers. However, this method may fail when the attacks are based on behavior and/or background knowledge. The generated false data is usually unreasonable; therefore, it is unsuitable in real applications. The data also accounts for a large portion of the computing resources and adversely affects the quality of services.
The restraining method involves keeping the sensitive data or location from being published [20] - [22] . This is the easiest and most effective way of protecting the user's privacy, since the attacker knows nothing private from the available data. However, valuable data may be lost, and the remaining datasets may be rendered useless. This method may not be effective in certain circumstances; for instance, if the data collector restrains the location data of the users and sends the modified data to the data miner. The data miner finds nothing valuable if it wants to learn location-based behaviors from the users because the correlated behaviors are broken down from the location data.
The generalization method involves generalizing the raw data. It often enlarges a certain area or geographical point [23] , [24] . The attackers are unable to discern the real location of the user from the generalized data. For instance, if a user's real location is the city square and the privacy protection method enlarges the location into a city district in which the city square stands, it then publishes the city district as the user's location to other applications. The other applications cannot predict the raw location of the user from the location of the city district; therefore, they cannot identify the real location of the user. The user's location privacy is therefore protected. While the generalization method can preserve the user's privacy to some degree, it may consume a large portion of computing resources as it requires these resources to calculate the generalized data.
Although current location privacy protection methods can protect users' privacy in certain ways, they neglect the correlations between the attributes of the algorithms and do not considers any tradeoffs between them in terms of the whole picture. In real applications, users may require different demands according to different situations and environments. Therefore, privacy protection methods need to provide robustness considering various attributes. In order to tackle these challenges, we propose a novel privacy protection method based on the coordinates mean value. The method aims to achieve trajectory protection and is optimized to obtain the best tradeoff considering different attributes. The proposed method can guarantee the usability of protected data while it can resist attacks such as background attacks and continuous query attacks.
The contribution of this paper to the field can be summarized from three perspectives. First, we propose a novel privacy protection algorithm based on the k-anonymity method with the goal of trajectory protection. It adopts the coordinates mean value to replace the real location datasets. Second, we use the stochastic gradient descent method to optimize the tradeoffs between different attributes, i.e., the degree of protection, anonymous time, cost, and loss. This optimization makes our algorithm more robust compared with other state-of-the-art location privacy protection methods. Third, we simulate the proposed algorithm using the dataset and evaluate its performance. We show how its performance changes using different k-values. The results are encouraging and demonstrate that our algorithm is effective.
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. In Section II, we will describe the proposed optimized algorithm in detail. We will analyze the security of this privacy protection method in Section III. In Section IV, we will simulate the algorithm and compare it with other similar methods. We will conclude the paper in Section V.
II. OPTIMIZED PRIVACY PROTECTION ALGORITHM BASED ON COORDINATES MEAN VALUE
We adopt the k-anonymity technique for the location-based privacy protection algorithm in order to preserve the SUs' privacy when they are enjoying location-based services provided by the PUs in the CRN. If one mobile SU's location privacy is protected from being disclosed, it should not be different from at least k −1 other SUs' locations. The larger the k-value is, the higher the degree of privacy protection. However, this method has costs: the quality of the location-based service. For instance, if one SU wants the recommendation from the PU about the stored location-related information, it first has to send its location to the PU. The more precise the location that is sent, the more accurate the recommendation of the PU is. If the location that the PU obtains from the SU is ambiguous, the PU does not have the ability to analyze the potential stores based on the vague geographical location.
Our algorithm, which uses k-anonymity, can be briefly explained as follows: one PU's location, represented by coordinates (x 0 , y 0 ), should not be distinguished from at least k−1 other PUs' locations, represented by coordinates (x i , y i ). All of these k PUs' locations satisfy the k-anonymity location privacy protection. The optimized privacy protection algorithm based on coordinates mean value (OPCM in short) will now be explained.
A. THE OPCM's PARAMETERS
Note that in our OPCM algorithm, we have chosen the independent architecture mode, in which the location servers (e.g., the PUs) and the application servers (e.g., the locationbased SPs) are separate from each other. The location servers receive the location information from the SUs and apply the privacy protection method to this data. Then they send the modified data to the application servers. The application servers provide location-based services according to the location data. The OPCM method generates the anonymous area according to the real SU's location points and sends the anonymous area data to the application servers. The parameters are as follows:
The location query information is Q. When the location server receives the query from the SU, the format of the query is Q = (P 0 (x, y), c, query). The coordinate P 0 (x, y) is the real geographical location of the user, the value c is the coefficient of the degree of privacy protection, and the string query is the request that the user sends to the application servers. Values x and y are the longitude and latitude coefficients.
The anonymous location query is Q . When the application server receives the request from the location server, the request takes the form of Q = {P(x, y), c, query}. The coordinate P is the result of the application of the privacy protection method.
The circular anonymous area radius is d max . For ease of computing, we have chosen the anonymous area of the SU to be circular. It is denoted as d max and d max = a × c, where the value a is the protection coefficient set by the location server.
The anonymous area is Z 0 . The anonymous area Z 0 is generated based on the SU's current locations. It is circular and has the radius d max . Thus, the SU's location is not shown in the application server. Instead, it is ambiguous and is replaced by area Z 0 .
The anonymous area is Z . Z is calculated based on the locations of the neighbors of the users. We have chosen the coordinate mean value of these neighbors' locations as the area's center, denoted by P. Z has the radius d max . Note that the two areas Z and Z 0 have different centers, but the same radius.
The location serving area radius is D max . This is for the service of the application server. The server chooses the circular area, which is centered at P and has the radius D max , as the serving boundary. Note that the value of D max has no direct connection to the value of d max . The former value is chosen to include the potential serving objects. For example, the application server recommends the stores items that fall into this area.
The degree of privacy protection is R. The information entropy is:
where x is the random variable, p(x) is the probability of a certain event, and X is the events set. R is defined in a similar way to the entropy. Assuming the successful guess of a user's privacy item as an event, then the act of attacking has a probability akin to probability p(x). Then, R is calculated as the entropy in (1). The higher the degree is, the better the privacy protection that the algorithm can provide. The data loss rate is DTL. The DTL is the Euclidian distance between the SU's real location P 0 and the anonymous location P. It is calculated as:
Note that the lower the DTL value is, the better the privacy protection of the algorithm provides.
B. THE FLOW OF THE OPCM ALGORITHM
The main task of the OPCM algorithm is to generate the anonymous area for the SU's real location and then to form the location service area based on the anonymous area. The application server can provide services according to this service area. The flow of the OPCM is shown in Fig. 1 . The steps of the flow can be divided into two sections: Section 1: Generate the anonymous area according to the SU's real location.
Step 1.1: The SU sends the request to the location server in the form of Q = (P 0 (x, y), c, query).
Step 1.2: The anonymous area Z 0 , which is centered at P 0 and has radius d max , is generated. VOLUME 6, 2018 Step 1.3: The n potential points, which are reasonable, are selected from the area Z 0 . It is determined whether the number n is greater than the SU defined number k. Note that in order to make our OPCM method pervasively suitable, we ask the SU only for the input number k. The number n is defined in our algorithm. If n is smaller than k, then the algorithm inserts random (k − n) points.
Section 2: The anonymous serving area is generated according to the neighbors of P 0 .
Step 2.1: The coordinate mean value is calculated from the k points as follows:
Step 2.2: The anonymous area Z, centered at P with a radius d max , is generated. The privacy protected request is sent with area Z information to the application server. Then, the application server provides the related services back to the SUs. The relationship between the anonymous area Z 0 generated by P 0 and the anonymous area Z generated by P is shown in Fig. 2 . We have chosen ten points, drawn in green crosses, from the area Z 0 . The boundary of Z 0 is depicted by a green circle with the radius of d max . The anonymous serving area Z is depicted by a red circle, in which the center of P is drawn in the form of a red triangle. This area has the same radius as area Z 0 . Note that the two areas do not coincide with each other. This is as a result of the location privacy protection method. Thus, in CRNs, the SU's real location is hidden and the anonymous area is used for the server application. The distance between the two centers, i.e., P 0 and P, should not be too large. Otherwise, the newly generated area would render the location-based service useless. Note that there are two anonymous areas, i.e., Z 0 and Z , in Fig.1 . They are totally different in terms of the centers. Z 0 is centered at point P 0 and Z is centered at P. Z is the area with privacy protection characteristics.
C. OPTIMIZATION BASED ON THE STOCHASTIC GRADIENT DESCENT
Our OPCM algorithm considers its performance in terms of four attributes: DTL, degree of privacy protection R, anonymous cost C, and anonymous time T . The cost is defined as the perimeter of the anonymous area. First, we establish the performance function, i.e., the object function, as follows:
where
The elements of θ is determined by the stochastic gradient descent method [25] , [26] .Note that the parameters of θ should be properly tuned to fuse the effects of each elements of W . The optimization problem is summarized as follows:
In practice, we solve the algorithm according to different values of k, which means that we test our OPCM algorithm using various settings of anonymity. For each value of k, we adopt the stochastic gradient descent method to obtain the optimal parameters θ . Then, we choose the best k-value of anonymity to determine the degree of privacy protection that the OPCM algorithm should provide in all given constraints. In order to make our study more concise, we have omitted the procedure of the stochastic gradient descent algorithm. The detailed algorithm is referred to in [26] .
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR PREVENTING ATTACKS
The OPCM algorithm aims to provide privacy protection to the SUs while the data modified after the OPCM should still be useful for the service application. The purpose of the attacks on the OPCM is to identify or guess the SUs' real locations from the modified data. There are two common attacks on privacy: the continuous query attack and the background knowledge attack. We will now analyze whether our algorithm can resist these two attacks.
A. THE CONTINUOUS QUERY ATTACK
This kind of attack involves the attacker intercepting the SU's location-based query information at continuous time slots, analyzing the different locations of each query, and calculating the SU's real location by applying the intersection to all locations. For instance, as shown in Fig. 3 , the attacker initiates the continuous query attack at four time slots: t1, t2, t3, and t4. At time t1, the query of the anonymous location is (A, B, D, E, F) . Similarly, at times t2, t3, and t4, the queries of the anonymous locations are (A, B, C, D, G), (A, B, C, E, G), and (A, E, C, F, G), respectively. Although the attacker knows nothing about the real location from one time slot, it can identify that location A is the real location using the intersection of these four queries. In our OPCM algorithm, we have chosen the coordinates mean value as the new anonymous area. The mean value is the average result of k reasonable points, which are the real locations of the neighbors of SU. If the attacker obtains the mean value from the continuous query attack and it wants to recover the SU's real location, it has to do reversing work. It should first deduce the k points from the mean value and then decide what point should be the center of these k neighbors. This is almost impossible for the reversing back. Even if the attack knows the set of the new anonymous centers, it is still unable to deduce the real location set.
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B. THE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ATTACK
In this case, the attacker obtains certain attributes from the SU's characteristics about their location and forms a basic profile of the SU. Then, the attacker excludes unrealistic points and deduces the SU's real position. For example, as shown in Fig. 4 , at time slot T1, the SU C initiates the location query. The anonymous area S1 is generated when the falsified points A and B are formed. At time slot T2, the SU C initiates the location query again and the anonymous area S2 is generated. The other falsified points A and B are formed. If the attacker knows the attributes of the SU, e.g., traveling speed V, then it can decide the maximum distance that the SU can travel during the time period (T2-T1). The areas S1 and S2 are depicted in red and blue, respectively. The potential maximum area perceived by the attacker is shown by a green circle. Now, the attacker can deduce that the real location is C by intersecting areas S2 and the area depicted by the green circle.
Our OPCM algorithm only allows the anonymous area to be represented by the center of the coordinates mean value and a defined radius. Therefore, there is no way for the attacker to discover the potential points. In other words, the attacker cannot guess the k points from the anonymity; therefore, it fails to conduct the intersection operation. Even if the attacker successfully obtains the speed attribute of the SU and it can form the likely distance circle (i.e., the green circle in Fig. 4) , it lacks points A, B, and C for the exclusion task.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
We conduct our simulation on a 64-bit Windows7 computer equipped with a 2.20 GHz CPU and a memory of 8GB. We use the Eclipse tool to realize the optimization of the OPCM algorithm. The data used in our simulation is taken from an open source database [27] , using which we mimic the trajectory of SUs traveling on the map. The results of these trajectories are used the evaluation of the OPCM's performance.
A. EVALUATION OF OPCM's RESISTANCE AGAINST ATTACKS
We have mentioned that in our OPCM algorithm, we adopt the degree of privacy protection R to numerically describe its resistance against attacks. Furthermore, in Section III, we analyzed the security of the OPCM against two common attacks. In this section, we will evaluate the performance of the OPCM's resistance against attacks as R. We will compare our method with the random k-anonymity privacy protection algorithm (RKPP in short), since the latter is the most widely used and most relevant method to ours. We have chosen attacks with and without background knowledge as the conditions for the attacks.
During the implementation of our OPCM method, we set the value of d max to determine the degree of privacy protection. As in the flow of the OPCM in Fig. 1 , if the number n of SU's neighbors is greater than the anonymity number k, then k points from those n neighbors are randomly chosen and used for calculating the coordinates mean value. If n is smaller than k, then insert k − n reasonable points to form the potential neighbors. Therefore, there is a total of k + 1 points, i.e., k neighbors and one real location point, in the anonymous area. If the attacker knows no background knowledge, then the probability of its successful identification of the SU's VOLUME 6, 2018 location is:
In some circumstances, there should be a weight about the attack action due to the background knowledge about the SU. The weight is denoted by Q, an integer within the range of 1 to n. Then, the probability of the attacker correctly guessing the location is:
where m is the number of points of an anonymous area, whose background knowledge the attacker knows at each location query request. The probability for the attacker successfully guessing the location without background knowledge is:
where Q i represents the weigh for the i th SU. When Q i equals 1, the attacker has no background knowledge. When Q i equals n, then the attacker knows all the background knowledge that will enable it to locate the SU. Once we obtain the formula for the probability, we can calculate the degree of privacy protection similar to the entropy. We show the results of the comparison between RKPP and OPCM in terms of the degree of privacy protection that they provide in Figs. 5 and 6, without and with background knowledge, respectively. The results are calculated in the form of (1). The horizontal axis represents the anonymity k-value, while the vertical axis represents the degree of privacy protection. This degree is measured by the bit unit. It can be observed that the OPCM has higher degree values than the RKPP in these two cases. One interesting point to note is that when k-value is small, the OPCM has a much larger degree increment than for larger k-values. However, for both algorithms, when k grows, the degree or protection also increases. We conclude that the OPCM method is much safer than the RKPP method.
In comparing the privacy protection of the two methods with and without background knowledge, we learn from Figs. 5 and 6 that background knowledge can assist the attacker in deducing SU's real location. For instance, when the k-value is 6, the degree of privacy protection without background knowledge is around 2.71 for OPCM and 2.52 for RKPP. Meanwhile, with background knowledge, the value is around 2.43 for OPCM and 2.21 for RKPP. This is as we expected. This is because if the attacker knows some prior information about the SU's movement, it would be much easier for the attacker to extract the real location. After all, our OPCM method can provide much more enhanced privacy protection than the RKPP method.
B. PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF ATTRIBUTES USING DIFFERENT K-VALUES
For the purpose of comparing the performance of the two methods in terms of different attributed, we have chosen to use the continuous query-based privacy protection algorithm (CQPP in short) [19] . The CQPP method is similar to OPCM. Both methods generate an anonymous area. However, the CQPP method uses a cloaking technique while ours uses the coordinates mean value. We compare these two methods in terms of anonymous time, cost, and loss.
The anonymous time is the period between the time at which the SU initiates the location-based service request and the time when the location service completes privacy protection. It can be used to measure the effectiveness of the privacy protection algorithm. The longer the time that is required, the worse the algorithm performs. Fig. 7 shows a comparison of the anonymous time for these two methods, where the horizontal and vertical coordinates represent the anonymity k-value and the time required. It is clear that with the k-value growing, both methods require a much longer time to process the anonymity task. However, our method requires less time than CQPP, especially when k is larger than 6. This is because CQPP needs much more time for a larger k-value as it requires various monitors to modify the points within the anonymous area, which consumes a large part of the anonymous time. When the k-value is small, i.e., less than 5, both methods need almost the same anonymous time.
As explained above, the anonymous cost is defined as the cost of the location server processing the anonymous area. It is quantified by the perimeter of the anonymous area. The average anonymous cost is the mean value of all the anonymous costs in the context of various query tests. The larger the perimeter is, the higher the cost is. We present an anonymous cost comparison in Fig. 8 , where the vertical axis is the cost, with the distance in km. It is clear that when anonymity increases, the cost of CQPP grows at nearly a linear speed. However, the cost of our method OPCM remains almost the same. It seems that the cost of OPCM is independent of the anonymous k-value. This is because in our algorithm, the size of the anonymous area can be determined by the parameter d max . In other words, the cost of anonymous processing is able to suit the conditions specified by the users and is more robust. However, CQPP allows no adjustment to the cost in accordance with different k-value settings. The data loss rate during the anonymous privacy protection process is measured by the distance between the location at which SU really stands and the location at which SU enjoys the anonymous service. The loss is presented in km. We compare the average data loss of these two methods in Fig. 9 . Clearly, the loss due to CQPP increases linearly when the anonymity k-value grows. This means that there is a much greater loss if stricter anonymous privacy is required for CQPP. However, OPCM shows a stable data loss rate when the k-value changes. Similar to the anonymous cost, this phenomenon is due to the anonymous area exhibiting a constant radius value. The stability of the average data loss is quite helpful for the location-based services, e.g., recommending nearby stores or restaurants.
In order to explain the tradeoff between these four attributes of OPCM, we show that the coefficients in (4) change according to different anonymity k-values. We compare the relationships between these coefficients, i.e., the θ vector. Figure 10 illustrates the relationships, where the horizontal axis denotes the k-value and the vertical axis denotes the corresponding coefficients. These coefficients are obtained when the object function achieves the minimum value. Note that in order to clearly represent these relationships, we formatted these four coefficients, i.e., all elements of vector θ amount to one.
As shown in Fig. 10 , for each specified k, the values of the coefficients are not the same. This is quite useful for different reasons. Note that in Fig. 10, θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 represent data loss, the degree of privacy protection, anonymous cost, and anonymous time, respectively. In some situations, in which the data loss should not be too large but the degree of privacy protection should be enhanced, then the anonymity value can be slightly smaller. In other situations, in which the anonymous time is not a big issue, then the anonymous can be larger. In real applications, the location server and SUs can negotiate to determine what the appropriate anonymous k-value should be.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a location-based privacy protection algorithm for SUs in CRNs. This method is based on the coordinates mean value in order to enhance its resistance against the continuous query attack and the background knowledge attack. The anonymous area in our algorithm can be set to meet different privacy protection requirements. The coordinates mean value is the average value of all neighbors within the anonymous area. To tradeoff between the attributes of privacy protection, i.e., data loss, degree of protection, anonymous cost, and time, we proposed a minimal optimization problem which is solved using the stochastic gradient descent method. The anonymity k-value can be determined based on the results of the optimal programming method according to different applications' requirements. We conducted simulations and compared our method with relevant privacy protection algorithms in terms of those four properties. The simulation results show that our method has advantages over other methods.
